Self Organizing Networks

WLAN IEEE 802.11

Max Riegel

Lectures overview June 14th - Wi-Fi deployments - Standardization environment - Wi-Fi system architecture - Wi-Fi security June 21st - Medium access functions - MAC layer management frame formats - Quality of Service - Wi-Fi roaming and Hotspot 2.0 - Wi-Fi roaming of GHz bands - Wireless channel characteristics - Wi-Fi radio for 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands - WiGig extension for 60 GHz bands - Wi-Fi rextension for 60 GHz bands - Wi-Fi rextension for below 1GHz bands - WI-Fi rextension for below 1GHz bands - WI-AN management

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WLAN for access to Internet

Standardization environment

IEEE 802.11 Standardization

Standards reference

Wi-Fi Alliance certification

WLAN System architecture

WLAN Configurations

Protocol architecture

=== short break ===

Security

District for in the first protocol architecture

=== short break ===

Security

District for in the first protocol architecture

=== short break ===

Topics covered in IEEE 802.11 security section

- IEEE 802.11 Security
 - Security evolution
 - Robust security network
 - Configuration
 - IEEE 802.1X Authentication
 - · PSK Authentication
 - Key management
 - Data protection
 - Summary
 - Protected management frames,
 - Fast transition


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
WLAN IEEE 802.11
INTRODUCTION


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
Consumer expectations on Wi-Fi (aka 'WLAN' in Europe) Wi-Fi is becoming considered a basic need like food, water, shelter and warmth In a couple of years all households will have Wi-Fi BELPARTEM MEMORY SAFETY BELPARTEM PROJUME LOW Freds Trainly State Low Percus CoolCool Fred Water Statle Warmth The hierarchy of human needs Wi-Fi is becoming considered a basic need like food, water, shelter and warmth In a couple of years all households will have Wi-Fi access is expected in public venues, hotels, coffee shops, shopping malls, airports, stations, trains, busses,... Charged access may still be accepted for premium locations or premium services Quality of 'free-of-charge' Wi-Fi access is becoming a differentiator for selecting goods and services - e.g. customers will avoid to stay in hotels with bad 'free' Wi-Fi




The ubiquitous WLAN Today everybody requires access to the Internet everywhere. Wi-Fi is more than just cable replacement, it provides hasslefree broadband Internet access everywhere. Pathypy Language Pathypy Languag







Functional decomposition of wireless network access



Control and IP connectivity

- · Subscription management
- · Terminal provisioning
- Authentication, authorization and accounting server
- IP address management
- IP connectivity establishment to Internet and services
- Policy & QoS management server (policy decision)
- Mobility Anchor
- · Roaming support to other cores

Access Network · Network advertisement

Pre-association signaling

L2 session establishment

accounting client

access networks


on L2 addresses


Authentication, authorization and


- w/ QoS and Policy Enforcement


L2 mobility management inside


Traffic forwarding to core based







































































































Program	Description	Remarks
Miracast™	Provides seamless display of content between devices, regardless of brand, without cables or a network connection. Miracast	"Wi-Fi Display Technical Specification"
TDLS (Tunneled Direct Link Setup)	Allows network-connected devices to create a secure, direct link to transfer data more efficiently	
Passpoint™	Enables mobile devices to automatically discover and connect to Wi-Fi networks. Passpoint also automatically configures industry-standard WPA2™ security protections without user intervention.	"Wi-Fi Alliance Hotspot 2.0 Technical Specification"
Wi-Fi Direct™	Allows Wi-Fi client devices that connect directly without use of an access point, to enable applications such as printing, content sharing, and display.	"Wi-Fi Alliance Peer-to-Peer Technical Specification"
Wi-Fi Protected Setup™	Facilitates easy set-up of security features using a Personal Identification Number (PIN) or other defined methods within the Wi-Fi device.	"Wi-Fi Simple Configuration Technical Specification"
WMM® (Wi-Fi Multimedia™)	Support for multimedia content over Wi-Fi networks enabling Wi-Fi networks to prioritize traffic generated by different applications using Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms.	"WMM Technical Specification"

Program	Description	Remarks
WMM-Power Save	Power savings for multimedia content over Wi-Fi net- conserve battery life while using voice and multimedia managing the time the device spends in sleep mode	
WMM-Admission Control	Enhanced bandwidth management tools to optimize voice and other traffic in Wi-Fi® networks.	the delivery of "WMM Technical Specification"
Voice-Personal	Voice over Wi-Fi - extends beyond interoperability tes performance of products and help ensure that they d quality over the Wi-Fi link	
Voice-Enterprise	Supports a good experience with voice applications of transitions between access points and providing man	
CWG-RF	For converged handsets with both Wi-Fi and cellular provides detailed information about the performance as well as about the coexistence of the cellular and V	of the Wi-Fi radio, enabled handsets
IBSS with Wi-Fi Protected Setup	Enables ad-hoc connections between devices to com as file printing or sharing. Designed to ease setup of devices with limited user interface.	






One common MAC supporting multiple PHYs Two configurations - "Independent" (ad hoc) and "Infrastructure" CSMA/CA (collision avoidance) with optional "point coordination" Connectionless Service - Transfer data on a shared medium without reservation - data comes in bursts - user waits for response, so transmit at highest speed possible - is the same service as used by Internet Robust against noise and interference (ACK) Hidden Node Problem (RTS/CTS) Mobility (Hand-over mechanism) Security (WPA2)

IEEE802.11 Architecture overview

Power savings (Sleep intervals)



WLAN IEEE 802.11
IEEE 802.11 SECURITY

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Topics covered in this section

• IEEE 802.11 Security

- Security evolution

- Robust security network

• Configuration

• IEEE 802.1X Authentication

• PSK Authentication


• Key management


• Data protection


• Summary


- Protected management frames,

- Fast transition














History of IEEE 802.11 Security Initial goal of P802.11 security was to provide "Wired Equivalent Privacy" Usable worldwide as there was strict export regulation at that time for any 'strong' security with more than 40bits keys EEEE 802.11-1997 provided shared key authentication based on WEP privacy mechanism RC4 algorithm with 40 bit secret key WEP was completely insufficient WEP unsecure at any key length No user authentication No mutual authentication No mutual authentication IEEE 802.11i-2004 fixed weak security by "Robust Security Network" (RSN) Transitional solution wi TKIP for fixing bugs in existing hardware Conclusive solution wi CKIP (AES) for new hardware Also known by WFAterms WPA(TKIP) and WPA2 (CCMP) WPA2 supported by all Wi-Fi hardware since about 2005












Robust Security Network Components • Establishes Robust Security Network Associations (RSNAs) • Comprises: - Configuration - IEEE 802.1X authentication - Key distribution by RADIUS - Key management - Data protection • CCMP (CTR/CBC-MAC Protocol) - Counter mode/Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code of AES, that achieves both confidentiality and integrity. • Amendment to RSN - Protected Management Frames





Configuration


- · Security requires networks with "right" characteristics
- AP advertises capabilities in Beacon, Probe Response
- SSID in Beacon, Probe provides hint for right authentication credentials
 RSN Information Element advertises all enabled authentication suites, all enabled unicast cipher suites and multicast cipher suites
- · At the end of discovery STA knows
 - SSID of the network
 - Authentication and cipher suites of the network
 - The preferred choice of authentication and cipher suites
- STA selects authentication suite and unicast cipher suite in Association Request


 STA and AP have an established Ethernet link

 - STA and AP are ready to authenticate by 802.1X











802.1X Authentication Establishment of a mutually authenticated session key between Authentication Server (AS) and STA $\,$ Session ⇒ key is fresh Mutually authenticated ⇒ bound only to AS and STA Authentication method defends against eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks, forgeries, replay, dictionary attacks against either party At the end of authentication: The AS and STA have established a session bound to a mutually authenticated Master Key authenticated Master Key Delivered by EAP method AS has forwarded PMK to the AP Identity protection not a goal MAC addresses are not hidden However, identities can protected by random MAC addresses and tunneled EAP methods


EAP Menthods, e.g. EAP-TLS


- · EAP-TLS is not part of 802.11i;
 - neither is any other specific authentication method
- · But EAP-TLS is the initial solution of an EAP method for IEEE 802.11
 - Can meet all IEEE 802.11 requirements
 - · Other widely deployed methods do not
- EAP-TLS = TLS Handshake over EAP
 - EAP-TLS defined by RFC 5216, TLS defined by RFC 2246
 - Must have the capability to verify the identity of the peer


 - Requires deployment of public key infrastructure
 Mutual authentication requires X.509 certificates for both, STA and Authentication Server














Key Management

- Redesigned by P802.11i to fix original 802.1X key management
 Derive a Pairwise Master Key (PMK)
 AP and STA use PMK to derive Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)
 Use PTK to protect the link
- Limitations:
 - No explicit binding to earlier association, authentication
 Keys are only as good as back-end allows
- 4-Way Handshake
 - Establishes a fresh pairwise key bound to STA and AP for this session
 Proves liveness of peers
- Proves inverless of peers
 Demonstrates there is no man-in-the-middle between PTK holders if there was no man-in-the-middle holding the PMK
 Synchronizes pairwise key use
 Group Key Handshake provisions group key to all STAs







DATA PROTECTION

Data Protection Requirements

- · Never send or receive unprotected packets
- · Authenticate message origin
- Forgeries prevention
- · Sequence packets
 - Replay detection
- · Avoid rekeying
 - 48 bit packet sequence number
- Protect source and destination addresses
- · Use strong cryptography
 - For both, confidentiality and integrity

CCM

- Counter mode with Cipher-block chaining Message authentication code (CCM)
 - A symmetric key block cipher mode providing confidentiality using counter mode (CTR) and data origin authenticity using cipher-block chaining message authentication code (CBC-MAC).

 See IETF RFC 3610

 - Assumes 128 bit block cipher IEEE 802.11i uses AES
 - AES realized in hardware
- CCM Properties
- CCM provides authenticity and privacyCCM is packet oriented
- CCM can leave any number of initial blocks of the plaintext unencrypted


CCMP (CTR with CBC-MAC Protocol) · CCMP makes use of CCM to Encrypt packet data payload
 Protect packet selected header fields from modification MIC Header Payload CBC-MAC used to compute a MIC on the plaintext header, length of the plaintext header, and the payload CTR mode used to encrypt the payload and the MIC Same 128-bit Temporal Key at both AP and STA

— Fresh key configured by 802.1X

Mandatory to implement in all Wi-Fi equipment

Encocially designed for IEEE 902.11 Especially designed for IEEE 802.11i

SUMMARY



Purpose of each phase

- Security negotiation

 Determine promising parties with whom to communicate

 AP advertises network security capabilities to STAs

 Authentication based on 802.1X

 Centralize network admission policy decisions at the AS

 STA determines whether it does indeed want to communicate

 Mutually authenticate STA and AS

 Generate Master Key as a side effect of authentication

 Use master key to generate session keys = authorization token

 RADIUS-based key distribution

 AS moves (not copies) session key (PMK) to STA's AP

 Key management by 802.1X

 Bind PMK to STA and AP

 Confirm both AP and STA possess PMK

 Generate fresh operational key (PTK)

 Prove each peer is live and synchronize PTK use

 Data Protection

 Encrypt data by CTR (AES)

- - Encrypt data by CTR (AES)
 Authenticate data by CBC-MAC (AES)

PROTECTED MANAGEMENT FRAMES

Protected Management Frames (PMF)

- Management frames are used to initiate and tear down sessions E.g.: authentication, de-authentication, association, dissociation, beacon, probe
- Management frames must be transmitted as open - To be heard and understood by all clients
- Protection necessary to avoid attacks through forgery
- IEEE 802.11w-2009 provides Protected Management Frames (PMF) service to
 - Disassociation

 - De-authentication, and
 Robust Action Frames (IEEE 802.11-2016 Table 9-47).
 - Le: Spectrum management, QoS, DLS, Block Ack, Radio measurement, Fast BSS Transition, SA Query, WNM, Mesh, Multihop, Vendor specific protected

PMF components and operation

- Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol
- Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK)
 - Random value, assigned by the broadcast/multicast source STA/AP
 Protection of its group addressed MAC management protocol data units (MMPDUs)
- Key Distribution:
- With PMF the AP includes the encrypted GTK and IGTK values in the EAPOL-Key frame
 Message 3 of 4-way handshake.
 For later changes of the GTK, AP sends the new GTK and IGTK to the client using the Group Key Handshake.
- Operation
 - Client protection is added by the AP adding cryptographic protection to de-authentication and dissociation frames
 - Infrastructure protection is added by adding a Security Association (SA) tear down protection mechanism.

IEEE 802.11 Security **FAST TRANSITION**

Fast BSS Transition

- Fast BSS transition reduces the interruption period between a STA and the DS during BSS transition.
- IEEE 802.11r-2008 supports fast BSS transitions between APs

 - Redefined the security key negotiation protocol by allowing both the negotiation and user data transmissions to occur in parallel.

 Key negotiation in IEEE 802.11i requires key renegotiation on every handoff


 Time consuming process, as shown before for EAP-TLS authentication
- Solution: caching in the wireless network part of the key derived from
 - Reasonable number of future connections based on the cached key.
- FT protocols are part of the re-association service


 Only apply to STA transitions between APs within the same mobility domain within the same ESS.


FT protocol overview

- Protocol initiated during the initial association of FT Originator (FTO) and AP.

 - Initial exchange: FT initial mobility domain association
 Subsequent re-associations to APs within the same mobility domain may make use of the FT protocols.
- Two FT protocols are defined:
 - FT Protocol when no resource request prior to its transition.
 FT Resource Request Protocol when a FTO has to request a resource prior to transition.
- - Over-the-Air Over-the-DS Between current AP and target AP communication is encapsulated as described in IEEE 802.11-2016: 13.10.3.
- APs advertise both, capabilities and policies for the support of the FT protocols and methods.







Questions...

WLAN Deployments

- What is the rough percentage of distribution of WLAN APs between residential, corporate and public?
 What are the 4 components of a wireless communication network?
- What are the main functions of the control and IP connectivity part of a wireless communication network?
- Which control plane functions of a WLAN session setup are executed before of the host configuration?
- What are the 3 stages of the 3-stage network specification method? What is described by the stage 2 of the 3-stages specification
- What is the purpose of the 802.1CF network reference model?
- Which operational role belongs to the subscription service?
- Which part of the link between Station and Access Router is realized by IEEE 802.11? 9)

More questions...

Standards Environment

- What part of a Wi-Fi access network is specified by IEEE 802.11?
 What is the purpose of the Wi-Fi Alliance?
 To which standardization organization belongs IEEE 802.11?
- Which IEEE 802.11 standards and amendments are comprised in IEEE 802.11-
- What layers of the ISO-OSI model are covered by IEEE 802.11?
- What aspects are covered through the Wi-Fi Alliance certification process? Which Wi-Fi Alliance certification program addresses direct connectivity between Wi-Fi clients without the use of an access point?
- What does 'WMM' stand for?

- WLAN System Architecture
 1) What are the two IEEE 802.11 Configurations?
 2) What function provides the Distribution System of the Infrastructure configuration?
- Which sublayer provides the convergence protocol between the PMD Sublayer and the MAC sublayer in the protocol architecture?

More questions...

- What are the initial MAC management message exchanges before the EAP authentication exchange?
- What does RSN mean?
- what uses now inlean?
 What is the purpose of IEEE 802.1X?
 What were the deficiencies of WEP aside of missing user authentication and mutual authentication?

- authentication?
 Which IEEE 802.11 amendment fixed the bugs of WEP?
 Which cryptographic methods are used by RSN of IEEE 802.11i?
 What kind of authentication is supported by IEEE 802.11i?
 Which name is used by Wi-Fi Alliance to denote the certification of IEEE 802.11i
 security based on AES encryption?
 What is the difference between WPA2-Enterprise and WPA2-PSK?
- Which authentication protocol is used in the Robust Security Network? What is the outcome of the configuration phase in the Robust Security Network? What is the pere entities of the EAP protocol in IEEE 802.11!? How is the master key transferred from the AAA server to the AP?

More questions...

Security, cont.

- 14) Which peer entities create the PMK used for the user data encryption in WPA2-Enterprise?
- Where is the supplicant located used in WPA2-Enterprise?

- 20)
- Where is the supplicant located used in WPA2-Enterprise?
 What is the function of the PAE in IEEE 802.1X?
 What kind of credentials are used in EAP-TLS to identify the peers?
 Why was the PSK method introduced in WPA?
 Which key is used for input to the 4-way handshake in RSN?
 What is the purpose of the group key in IEEE 802.11?
 Which default key length is used in RSN for AES?
 Why is it important that CCMP protects but does not encrypt the header part of a WLAN frame?
 What is the purpose of Protected Management Frames?
 What is the purpose of Fast BSS Transition?
 How can the Fast Transition Originator communicate with the Target AP?
- 23)
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